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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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-vs. -

Case No.

12045

BOUNTIFUL CITY, a Municipal Corporation and DAVIS COUNTY, a Body
Politic of the State of Utah,
Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANT, BOUNTIFUL'S,
BRIEF ON APPEAL
Appeal from a Judgment of the Second District Court
of Davis County
Hon. John F. Wahlquist, Judge
GEORGE K. FADEL
170 West Fourth South
Bountiful, Utah
Attorney for DefendantsDAVID E. WEST
Walker Bank Building
·'
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents ·
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
,\. FOSS PETERSON, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

- vs. BOUNTIFUL CITY, a Municipal Corporation and DAVIS COUNTY, a Body
Politic of the State of Utah,

Case No.

12045

Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANT, BOUNTIFUL'S,
BRIEF ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiffs-Respondents are owners of eighteen parcels of land which were part of a 108 acre tract annexed
by Bountiful, Utah, but which annexation ordinance was
declared invalid by this Court, whereupon the respondents commenced an action to recover the portion of the
19G7 tax levied by Bountiful, Utah, prior to the decision
of this Court. The lower court granted judgment to the
respondents for their respective portions of the taxes
paid together with interest.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's judgment and a dismissal of the complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The complaint alleged that tlie plaintiffs are owners
of real property in Davis County, Utah, which at all
times was outside the corporate boundaries of Bountiful,
Utah, and that during 1967, Bountiful, improperly and
unlawfully levied a property tax upon their eighteen
parcels of land which tax was collected by Davis County.
It was further alleged that the snit was to recover an
improper and illegal tax paid under protest pursuant to
Section 59-11-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in the
amounts recited as to each plaintiff ranging from $33.33
to $293. 70, involving a total of all claims of about
$1,221.01.
This case is a sequel to Jensen vs. Boiintifitl City. 20
Utah 2d 159, 435 P.2d 28-1, December 12, 1967, wherein
this Court held that where there were 373 mvners shown
on the assessment rolls of whom 199 had signed a petition for annexation but 26 of whom had the right to withdraw their signatures before the council acted upon the
petition leaving but 173 valid signatures of a required
187 to constitute a majority, the annexation ordinance
was invalid even though the remaining signatures after
allowing the withdrawal of 26 names ·would constitute a
majority of the owners of record as shown in the office
of the County Recorder.

At the trial of the instant case, the plaintiffs made
an oprning statement, offered no testimony, but submitted Exhibit "A," a letter dated October 27, 19139, from
n·spondPnt's counsel to appellant's counsel stating the
Pvidencc of protest given by Pach claimant and it was
stipulatt·d by both partiPs that this was the extent of
the Pvidence of protest (tr. 4). An analysis of Exhibit
",\'' !'hows that with tlw exception of the protest of Hayward, all other protests amount to a notation on the
eheek to tl1e Davis
Treasurer to the eff<>ct "Paid
nnder Protest," withont specif>ring whether all or part
was paid under protest or any reason therefor. Hayward's protest
the portion paid under protest
in a f'PIJarate letter to the Davis County TrPasnrPr.
The respondents rt>sted after offering Exhibit "A,"
1rhrrenpon appellant moved to dismiss for reasons among
others, that insufficienC>' of the protest and de facto
Pxistenee prior to the decision of this Court constitute
a defpnse to the claims. The court denied the motions to
dismiss rxcept that as to de facto existence the court
1<tatPd this matter was 01wn to further fl'idence (tr. 6).
AppPllant called Grant Petersen,
Manager of
Donntifnl, Utah, who testified that the total area comprised by the subject annexation ordinance was about
lll,S acres of a total city area of 4,34G acres or 2.4% (tr. 9).
That tlw total taxes eol!Pcted from the 108 acre area
i'or Ow
was $8,539.93 (tr. 10). That city serTicPs
lllade available to the separated area included police $:J,33S.'.20, fin• protection - $833.45, adrninistratiye -
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$3,416.50, street maintenance - $6,730.40, or a total of
$14,338.55 calculated by taking a 2.4% of the budget for
such items except that street maintenance was based
upon 3.2 miles of a 75 mile total system. His testimony
was summarized in Defendant's Exhibit 1. He further
testified that the annexation ordinance was adopted in
December 1966 and that thereafter the city endeavored
to serve the area on an equal basis with other areas of
the city until the decision of this Court after December
12, 1967 (tr. 11). Other services such as water, sewer
and power were supplied the area by separate. districts
and a private utility which were already established and
serving the area.
The court took the matter under advisement and invited briefs from counsel on the issue of de facto existence of the city until the decision of this Court, Dcember 12, 1967 (tr. 30). About five weeks later the trial
court directed counsel for the plaintiffs to prepare findings and judgment for the plaintiffs (tr. 28).

POINT I
A CITY WHICH EXTENDS ITS BOUNDARIES UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY ENJOYS DE FACTO EXISTENCE IN THE
ANNEXED AREA UNTIL OUSTED THEREFROM
BECAUSE OF IRREGULARITIES IN ANNEXATION
PROCEDURES, AND TAXES THERETOFOR COLLECTED ARE VALID.

The controlling distinction in the cases ·which allow
or disallow de facto existencP to a city in an annexed
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area, is whether thefr attempted annexation was authorized by the provisions of constitution and/or statute but
failed to conform to the technical requirements thereof,
or was an attempt to annex an area when by constitution
or statute no provision existed to authorize such an exknsion of boundary.
The proposition js well stated in the case of ToU'n of
Largo vs. Richmond, 109 F2d 740, (Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals) :
"The Florida decisions all point out that while
the excessive extension of territory by the legislature may subject the municipality to a judgment of ouster and prevent it as to the future,
from exercising jurisdiction over the improvidently annexed territor>·, it does not prevent the
municipality from being one, at least de facto,
from the time of the extension until the ouster
as to all the territory, the>· settle it to that too,
as to the bonds and obligations created to exist
after the onster is liable."
An annotation in 13G ALR 187 revie"·s several cases
and
text at the bottom of
195 states:
"In T Dillon on
Corporations, 5th
Edition, Sec. 67, it is said that 'Where a reputed
corporation is acting under forms of law, unchallenged h>· the state, neither the nature nor the
l'xtent of any illegality in the organization can
dfret the exist(·11cc' of the reputed corporation.
\Vl1t·n' tlwse requisites occur tlwre is a de facto
col'j;oration.' And it would seem to be the general rulP that municipal corporations, particularly
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those whose existence is consistent ·with the paramount law and the general system of law in the
state, are corporations de facto, even though organized under an unconstitutional statute."
The annotation commences a revie .v of cases and under
the last paragraph on page 196 "United States" refers
to annexations wherein the municipality is deemed a de
facto municipality in the area from the time of the
extension to the time of ouster.
pages 196 and
202 several cases acknmYledging the de facto existence
are cited. Then in the conclusion on page 204 in the last
paragraph the author states that while private corporations are rarely given a de facto status, nevertheless,
1

"l'Vhcn it comes to municipal corporations,
however, it can be said without fear of si1ccessf1tl
contradiction that the cases denyiug a de facto
statns are in the mi·nority and that the ge11rral
rule is iu favor of s11ch statits on the gro1mds of
]J1llJlic policy and P:r:pedicncy."

8ome courts relate the matter to the power of the acting
body under constitution or statute. At the time of trial
tlw defendants cited to the conrt the case of City of
Winterhaven 'Vs. Gill('svie, 5th Circuit, 84 F2d 285 at
page 287. This Florida city consisted of 1430 acr('s and
under a new statute annexed 9410 acres. rrhe annexation
statute
held not hroad enough to allow arnwxatio11
of more than 800 acres. The issue hen'
wlwther tlw
he JjalJlP for its share of
newly annexed territory
$3,3'.20,000.00 bonds. 'l'he circuit eonrt held that:
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''Under these circumstances it may not be
donhted that under both state and federal decisions the anm"xed territory remains liable for
those bonds and must pay them; for the defect
for which the judgment of ouster was entered
went, not at all to the power of the legislature
nnder the Constitution, but to a defect in the form
the extension of the power took. The ouster proceeding was therefore without effect as to these
bonds."
The court fnrtlter held that the Florida Supreme Court's
decision directing foe entry of a judgment of ouster was
not retroactive and was directed to the future and that
any obligations incurred prior to the ouster were properly chargeable against the annexed territory.

The Winterhaven case was cited and distinguished
in tlw case of Ocean Beach Heights, J.nc. vs. Brown-Critm111er Im 1• Co., 302 U.S. 614 (1938). In this Ocean Beach
ease a Florida town on one side of a river attempted to
annex land on the other side of the river bnt since the
anrn•xations were reqnired to he contiguous the courts
h1•ld that the town ·was without power to annex land on
the other side of the river. It was held in this instance
that because the attempted annexation \\·as unauthorized,
roiu and ·withont color of title there could be no de facto
C'oq1oratio11 which would render the disconnected lands
lialil1'. Hmn•ver, it cites the \Vinterhaven case and otlwr
t·ases as goocl faith attempts to organize municipalities
1rhich are 1m'sm11cd valid until aujndged repugnant to
law.
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The re spondents' letter to the trial court as a "Memorandum of Authorities" quoted what was termed a statement of the general law from 37 Am. Jnr., Municipal
Corporations, Section 33, as follows:
1

"If territory is improperly sought to be annexed by a municipal corporation, and the annexation proceedings are successfully attacked by the
state in quo warranto proceedings, the annexation
does not aequire a de facto status so as t0 give
the municipal corporation any rights thereunder."

However, as pointed ont by appellant's response thereto
(R 29), the foregoing quotation from 37 Am.Jur. is supported by only one case, Balkan v. Bithl, 158 Minn. 271,
197 N.vV. 266, 35 A.L.R. 470. The annotation in 35 ALR
states that the case of Balkan v. Buhl is the only one of
its kind, with one exception, and both cases invoke disputes between municipalities wherein the contested extension of boundaries ·were witl10ut statutory authority.
Balkan v. Bnl11 was an attempt by the tmvn of Buhl
to annex a rich ore area which was already ·within the
corporat<:• limits of the town of Balkan. The county auditor had placed the disputed area on the tax records for
Buhl which reeeived thP tax money. Balkan sued to recover the taxc•s colleeted h:- Buhl from this ore arPa.
The court, ·while recognizing the doctrine of de facto
existence stated that since• the disputed area was already
a part of the municipality of Balkan, it could not under
the ·Minnesota statute be annexed to Bu.hl. This decision is consistent w1th the cases cited hy appellants in
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support of de facto existence where the annexation is
under power or authority of statute but fails for some
irrrg11larity.
Another case cited and relied upon by respondents
Barton v. Stnckry, 121 Okl. 226, 248 P. 592, where
the city's attempted annexation was under its home rule
charter which differed from statutory requirements, and
the eonrt held that since there was no attempt to follow
the statutory requirements the annexation ordinance was
deemed a nullity and void. However, in this decision and
many subsequent cases the Oklahoma courts recognize
that where the city council reasonably attempts compliance with statute, but fails because of informalities or
irregularities, the city nevertheless acquires authority
and jnrisdiction over the area, which precludes collateral
attack, although the issue of de facto existence is not
lllPntioned by the conrt.
\\'aS

De facto existence is not recognized in those instanct>s where if the city had complied with all known
requirements of statute or constitution there still -..rnuld
he an absence of authority to complete a de jure annexation.
POINT II
WHERE STATUTE REQUIRES PAYMENT UNDER
PROTEST AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO AN
ACTION TO RECOVER TAXES UNLAWFULLY ASSESSED, SUCH PROTEST MUST IN SUBSTANCE
DESCRIBE THE PORTION OF THE TAX PROTESTED AND THE REASON THEREFOR.
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The statute relating to actions to recover taxes paid
under protest is as follows:
"59-11-11. Payment under protest-Action to re.
cover.-In all cases of levy of taxes, licenses, or
other demands for public revenue which is deemed
unlawful by the party whose property is thus
taxed, or from whom such tax or license is demanded or enforced, such party may pay under
protest such tax or license, or any part thereof
deemed imlawfill, to the officc'rs designated and
authorized by la:w to
the same; and therrupon the party so paying or his his legal representative may bring an action in any comt of
competent jurisdiction against the officer to whom
said tax or license was paid, or against the state,
county, municipality or other taxing unit on whose
behalf the same was collected, to recover said tax
or license or any portion thereof paid wzd<'r protest."
In this case all of the protests, except that of Haywards ', were short notations on the check to the DaYii'
County Treasurer to the effect "Paid under Protest."
As stated in Albro v. Kettelle, 107 Atl. 198, a general
protest is not sufficient and "should point out ,,·ith reasonable certainty the defect or error upon which protest
is based." It is further sta tl'd therein that the dang-er of
allowing a general protest is that no OllpOrtunity to CUJ'I'
the defect is allowed and any subsecpwnt determination
of illegality would be
tlw gpneral prote,;t and could
bankrupt a co1mnuniJy. A more recent example of thl'

11
, i11·ril of allowing a general protest such as "Paid under
l'rntest" is that relating to taxation for payment of
)1onds where the election authorizing the bonds may not
!1nxe been conducted according to constitutional reqnireIf thP Treasurer were informed by the protest
that it relatPd to the bonds, he could withhold exp('nclitnre thereof pending a final determination of the legality
nf the tax; however, in the absence of an explanation,
the TreasurPr does not knffw what portion is claimed to
be illegal and is faced with the decision to withhhold all
or transmit all of the tax collected.
1

The form of the protest does not appear to be as
important as the substance and may even he oral if prop1Tl)· noted by the Treasurer. In the case of ilhtrdock v.
llurdock, 38 e. 373, 113 U. 220, the taxpayer, Mnrdock,
lirnnght snit against the Treasurer of -Wasatch County,
Larina J\Inrdock, and Heber City, to recov<·r taxt>s paid
11pon slwep, since the sheep at no time were in HPb('r
l'it)· and were not subject to the leyy of Heber City.
Tlt0 C'ollnty 'l'reasurer answered that she received thP
· nn111'.\' and is holding the same in trust to pay it as the
1 "11urt may direct. No formal proof of protest was offered
:it tltP trial bnt the Supreme Court held that this was not
11 1wssary in view of only a general denial
Heber City
tlw allegation that payrnt:>nt had been made under
11 rotest. \\'t• quote the pertinent portion of the opinion:

"Furtltt>r, \'."!:' arP of the opinion that under tlw
prn,·i:c;ions of S<'rtion :2(iS-1, Comp. Laws 1907, tlw
Jltl.\'lllPnts as madP h.\· appP!lant and his assignor:c;
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as the same were by the treasurer noted on the
tax records constituted a payment under protest.
No particular form of protest is requirt>d by the
statute. Nor is it required that a protest be in
writing. From the facts as admitted by the treasurer, she clearly understood that that portion of
the taxes which were claimed by Heber City were
paid under protest because they were claimed to
he illegal for the reason that the sheep upon which
they were levied at no time 1vere 1Yithin the tenitorial limits of said city. ·what more could be
required? When the statute prPscribes no special
conditions in making a protest, it would seem that
the courts can rPqnire non(>."
·while the foregoing case dispensPs with the necessit:
of any special form of protest, it emphasized that th1•
substance of the protPst was sufficient.

By way of contrast, in the instant case the rPspondents' proof shows nothing more than the notations on
the checks. There is no indication tJiat the treasurer ewr
noted the same in the record, or could have known "·hat
portion of the tax was prott>sted nor the reasons tlterrfor, nor did he r<>tain any portion of tlw tax in trm'!
or notify Bountiful of any payment nnder profrst.
'l'his court has commented on the propriety of an
explained protest in the case of Neilson v. 8c111 Pete Co11 11 ty, -±0 U. 5GO, 123 Pac. 33-± (1912). 'l'lw appellants Neibon
11
and anotlH·r brought snit against
Pde Connt:· 1
recoyer certain taxes which tlH·y alleged 1nre illegal.
void and illegaly colledP<l 1iy the county
!eyy'.ng anil

--1

13

collecting taxes upon personal propert.\·, mortgages, in
absence of any law allowing the taxation of mortgagPs.
Ap]Jellants alleged that they paid the taxes "hut that
payment was not Yoluntariy made.'' 'rhe trial court
snstained a demurrer to the complaint. On appeal, the
appellants claimed their action is sustained by Section
2G42 of Compiled Laws of 1907, which is the same as
59-10-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and as stated by
the court, relates to recovery of taxes to which the county
''has no right whatever becanse they were already paid,
or because they should not have been collected, or becanse absolutely illegal and void for other reasons," in
which event no formal or verified claim need be filed with
the county commissioners and it is only necessary that
a demand in ·writing for the retnrn thereof be made. San
Pete Connty contended that the appellants were suing
under Section 2684 which is the same as 59-11-11, Utah
Co<lP Annotated 1953, and are preclud0d by not having
protested. This court stated in comment 3,
pagp 5G7, that the taxes were not paid under protest as
required hy Section 2684 (59-11-11) hut that appellant's
had not elected to proceed nndPr this section and could
n·I:< npon Section 2642 (59-10-14). 'l'he conrt t11en made
this i11q1ortant ohseryation concerning the extent of protest required, and we qnote comment G:
"(Jiving the language rnwd in both of those
seetiom; its orclinar:-· mPaning, it is clear that the
JlllI'JlOse of s<:>dion 2G84 is to give the taxpayer
an opportunity to eontest the right of the county
to eoll<:>et eertain taxrs, licenses, or demands for
l'<'nlllH', or all.\' 11ortion thereof, h,\· paying the
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whole under protest, and then sue to recovPr all
or any portion that he may be entitled to. It is
also clear that the taxes, licenses, or demand,;
referred to in that section are such as are "deemed
unlawful" by the taxpayer before payment is
made. Sitch taxes, licenses, or demands may, however, not be deemed imlawfiil by the officers who
are requfred to collect them, and hence the taxpayer is reqiiired to indicate to the officers what
portion he deem,s imlawful, and tlms pay such
part itnder protest for the purpose of laying rr
foitndation for an action to test their legality.
Under sitch circitmstances, it is fair a11d just that
the taxpayer be reqnired to indicate what portion
of the ta.x he will contest on the ground of illegality, so that the officers can govern themselves
accordingly in making the proper apportiomneut
of the taxes.
In the case at bar, the respondents did not meet the minimum requirements as to protest as reviewed herein.
A protest is a remonstrance or objection. It could
take many forms for many reasons, some of which would
have no relationship to the validity of the tax. Just as
an objection or exception to evidence, rulings and instructions, is required by court decisions to statt> a
reason for the objection or exception to give the court
an opportunity to correct an error, so for similar purposes the protest to a tax should specify the basis for
the protest.

CONCLUSION
The appellant having proceeded in good faith to
annex the respondent's property hy anthority of statute

-I
I

I
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but failing in procedure caused in part

by a late withdrawal by some of the petitioners for an-

nexation, and having expended proportionately more for
t11e annexed area than was collected, should be deemed
to have been a de facto city until ousted by decision of
this Court. Also the failure to file a sufficient protest
is a bar to the respondents' claims. The decision of the
trial court should be reversed and the complaint dismissed.
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170 West Fourth South
Bountiful, Utah

Attorney for Appellant,
Boitntifitl, Utah

